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TWENTY-SIX YEARS UNDER THE COLORADO
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
WILLIAM E. MEYERS
o1 the Denver Bar *
With the purpose in mind "... to settle and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, or other
legal relations,"1 the 1923 General Assembly of Colorado enacted
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. It is believed that the
value of this Act, both past and future, is sufficient to warrant a
review of the seventy cases reported since that time in an effort
to determine the applicability of the Act to future litigation.
The purpose of the Act was clearly remedial.2 The primary
distinction between a case instituted under this Act and any other
litigation is that in the former no objection can be made on the
ground that further relief is not or could not be claimed.3 Further-
more, although an actual, justiciable controversy must exist before
the courts can take jurisdiction of an action for declaratory relief,
it is not necessary that one of the parties litigant has sustained an
actual injury.4 Hence, the parties to a contract, engaged in a dis-
pute over its legal effect, may have a judicial determination of their
rights prior to an actual breach ;5 an insurer may have his rights
declared prior to an actual claim for payments by the beneficiary ;6
a taxpayer who is threatened with assessment may bring an action
to have his rights and duties declared under an applicable tax
statute prior to paying under protest.' These are only a few ex-
amples of the value and practicability of the declaratory judgment.
To construe the Act as requiring a breach of duty as a condition
precedent to bringing the action would clearly defeat the purpose
of the Act.8 Herein, however, lies the primary difficulty in applying
the Declaratory Judgments Act to any given set of facts. For un-
less there are adverse parties and unless there exists either an
actual controversy or the ripening seeds of one, the courts will
consider the question hypothetical, moot, or in the nature of an
advisory opinion, and they will hold that any determination of such
a question will constitute an extra-judicial or non-judicial function.9
These requisites were firmly established in Colorado by a very
Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 89 (1935).
2 It is asserted, however, by some writers that granting declaratory relief is within
the inherent powers of the courts without statute, ANDERSON, DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS
(1941).
:COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93, § 78 (1935).
'BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934).
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 80 (1935) ; Highland Sales v. Roberts, 104 Colo. 222,
90 P. 2d 2 (1939).
'Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
'Armstrong v. Carmen Distributing, 108 Colo. 223, 115 P. 2d 386 (1941).
'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93. § 91 (1935) ; BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1Q34).
'Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 846 (1911).
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well-reasoned opinion by Justice Burke in Gabriel v. Board of
Regents.10 This action was brought under the following provision:
"Any person interested under a ... writing constituting a contract
... may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument . . ."11 Plaintiff's assignor had
entered into a contract with the Board of Regents of the University
of Colorado whereby the Board was to lease him certain land. The
suit was instituted three days after execution of the contract for
the purpose of seeking a declaration as to whether or not the
Board of Regents had the power to make this lease. The complaint
failed to allege that the validity of said contract had been ques-
tioned, and the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justici-
able controversy over which the court could assume jurisdiction.
The court continued by saying:
This Act (Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act) was
not intended to repeal the statute prohibiting judges from
giving legal advice, nor to impose duties of the profession
on courts, nor to provide advance judgments as the basis
for commercial enterprise, nor to settle mere academic ques-
tions.
With this decision in mind, it is important for attorneys who
contemplate u~ing this Act to determine as nearly as possible what
constitutes an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, for
the objection of lack of justiciability is always present as a defense
to a declaratory action. Therefore, it is necessary to review the
reported Colorado decisions in order to ascertain what does, in fact,
constitute justiciability.
EFFECTIVELY USED TO DETERMINE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
The action has been used very effectively in Colorado in order
to ascertain rights under a written contract prior to an actual
breach, 1 2 or even after breach when an action for damages or
specific performance could have been sustained. 13 It should also be
noted that, although the statute 14 specifically authorizes actions
under "writings" constituting a contract, one case in Colorado has
sustained an action for interpretation of an oral contract, 15 indi-
cating a liberal application of the Act. On the basis of these deci-
sions, the court apparently feels that a controversy is justiciable
under this section if the parties to the instrument actually challenge
its validity,' or disagree as to their rights and duties under the
instrument 17 or as to the legal effect of the contract.'8 Of course,
1083 Colo. 582, 267 P. 407 (1928).
11 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 79 (1935).
1 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 80 (1935) ; Equitable Life v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231,
67 P. 2d 80 (1937).
'1 Tellman v. Smith, 112 Colo. 217, 148 P. 2d 581 (1944) ; Bennett's. Inc. v. Krogh,
115 Colo. 18, 168 P. 2d 554 (1946).
14 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 80 (1935).
15 Highland Sales v. Roberts, 104 Colo. 222, 90 P. 2d 2 (1939).
1" Highland Sales v. Roberts, supra, note 15.
11 Bennett's, Inc. v. Krogh, supra, note 13.
"Todd v. Elkins, 101 Colo. 269, 72 P. 2d 696 (1938).
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if there has been an actual breach, there can be no denial of just-
iciability. 19
USE IN CONNECTION WITH WILLS AND TRUSTS
In an action for construction of a will, the Supreme Court in-
dicated that a court of general jurisdiction had this power even
prior to passage of the Act.2 0 The court further stated, however,
that it would not entertain questions which had not yet arisen in
the administration of the trust and would refuse to answer specu-
lative inquiries.
USED TO TEST CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW
In several cases, the constitutionality of statutes and ordin-
ances has been attacked.2 1 Petitioner, however, must be an adverse
party and have sufficient ipterest to attack the statute.2 2 Moreover,
as in every other action for a declaratory decree, there must be a
justiciable controversy.2 3 The fact that both parties to a declara-
tory action may concede the appropriateness of the procedure would
not seem to preclude the court from requiring this element; how-
ever, the court apparently refused to recognize this requirement in
McNichols v. Denver.2 4 An ordinance was passed by the city of
Denver providing, in effect, that when a vacancy was created in a
Justice of Peace Court, the mayor could transfer jurisdiction to
municipal judges. Shortly after passage of the ordinance, the city
auditor brought an action against the city to test its validity. The
district court entertained the action and declared the ordinance
valid, the result being reversed by the Supreme Court without ques-
tioning justiciability. Justice Burke, however, in a highly practical
and well-reasoned concurring opinion, pointed out that no legal
right, status, or other legal relation was uncertain, that no vacancy
had occurred, nor had any question of applying this ordinance been
raised. Justice Burke took the position that the court should not
"sit to adjudicate every street squabble about what the law might 25
be if the impossible happened, simply because the disputants might
so stipulate. ' ' 2 He clearly considered this case hypothetical. His
conclusion seems correct.
27
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS USEFUL IN TAX FIELD
One of the most effective uses of the declaratory judgment is
in the field of taxation. A taxpayer is able to have his rights liti-
gated under applicable tax statutes prior to an actual payment of
19 Tellman v. Smith, aupra, note 13.
=Mulcahy v. Johnston, 80 Colo. 499, 252 P. 816 (1927).
McNichols v. Denver, 109 Colo. 269, 124 P. 2d 601 (1942).
=Rinn v. Bedford. 102 Colo. 475, 84 P. 2d 827 (1938).
"Gabriel v. Board of Regents, aupra, note 10.
24109 Colo. 269, 124 P. 2d 601 (1942).
2Italics added.
2McNichols v. Denver, aupra, at 276 et seq.
27 In some jurisdictions, however, if the question was of great public interest, the
rule of justiciability has been relaxed. See, ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDOMENTS, p. 43
(1941).
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the tax.28 Declaratory judgment actions in this field have been in-
stituted primarily to determine the status of the taxpayer 29 or the
classification of articles under a statute.30 The actions were just-
iciable under the theory that the state treasurer had either made a
demand on the taxpayer or had issued a directive including the un-
certain articles. An action will not lie, however, if the ordinance
in question bas not yet been passed.
31
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION OF ACT
While the foregoing uses of the Act in Colorado have perhaps
occurred more frequently, actions have been brought under the
Act for various other purposes. Such other actions in the Colorado
courts for declaratory decrees include those involving (1) declara-
tion of status and rights under applicable statutes and ordinances,
32
(2) construction of statutes and ordinances, 3 3 (3) questions of
titles and marketability,3 4 (4) power of governmental bodies, 35 (5)
rights of insurers and beneficiaries under policies and statutes,3 6
(6) rights of holders of government and municipal bonds, 37 and (7)
construction of oil and gas leases.
3
The use of declaratory judgments action in Colorado has not
been extensive, but under the Federal act of the same nature, many
varying causes of action have been instituted. The intent of the Act
as passed in Colorado is that it be interpreted in the light of Federal
decisions. 39
LIBERAL INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY SUPREME COURT
What then constitutes justiciability? When are the seeds of
the controversy sufficiently "ripe" to sustain an action for a dec-
laratory decree? Although judicial precedents may guide us in our
inquiry in a given factual situation, no all-inclusive answer may be
given to these questions. Although we may say facts "indicative
of threatened litigation in the immediate future which seems un-
avoidable ' 40 constitute the "ripening seeds" of a controversy, the
final determination of a given set of facts can be determined only
by the courts. One consideration to keep in mind, however, is that
23See, San Luis Power v. Trujillo, 93 Colo. 385, 26 P. 2d 537 (1933), in which the
court held the Declaratory Judgments Act constitutional, saying, "Preventive relief is
a matter of judicial function and is res judicata as to the issues presented." Bennett's
Inc. v. Carpenter, 111 Colo. 63, 137 P. 2d 780 (1943).
2' See, San Luis Power v. Trujillo, supra, note 28.
=
5
Bedford v. Johnston, 102 Colo. 203, 78 P. 2d 373 (1938).
"Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198, 274 P. 743 (1928), citing Gabriel v.
Board of Regents, supra, note 10.
2Washington Co. High School District v. Board of Commissions, 85 Colo.. 72, 273
P. 879 (1928) ; Smith Printing v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 85 P. 2d 39 (1939). The latter
case contains an excellent dissent by Burke on the issue of justiciability.
"Colorado and Utah Coal v. Walter, 75 Colo. 489, 226 P. 864 (1923).
. Union Colony v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P. 2d 120 (1939).
u Montgomery v. Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P. 2d 434 (1938).
"Continental Ins. v. Cochran, 89 Colo. 462, 4 P. 2d 308 (1931).
7Employers' Mutual v. Board of County Commissioners, 102 Colo. 177, 78 P. 2d
380 (1938).
NHill v. Stanolind Oil, 119 Colo. 477, 205 P. 2d 643 (1949).
S COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 91 (1935) ; for a comprehensive review of federal cases
see, ANDERSON, DECLARATORy JUDGMENTS (1941).
4°In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 A. 675 (1930).
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in the past the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected less than 10
per cent of the approximately seventy actions for declaratory relief.
This would seem to indicate a tendency on the part of the court to
interpret the statute quite liberally and, in some instances, even to
disregard the question of justiciability unless it is raised in the
briefs.
41
Some relatively concrete observations can be made, however,
as follows: an action brought uider the Declaratory Judgments
Act is tried in the same manner as any other action brought under
the rules of civil procedure;42 it is res judicata as to the issues
presented ;43 and any decree rendered can be presented for further
relief when it is necessary. 4 I Furthermore, although the cases are
in hopeless conflict, the more liberal rule seems to be that an action
for a declaratory decree should be entertained even though another
remedy exists.
45
Although some critics have asserted that the declaratory judg-
ment is academic and is of little practical value, it is believed that
its uses as pointed out in this paper have in some way indicated
the practicability of this action. 46 This practicability was foreseen
by Congressman Gilbert in debate on the first Federal declaratory
judgments bill when he said, "Under the present law you take a
step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you stepped into
a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you turn on the light
and then take the step. ' 47
Personals
Chief Justice Benjamin C. Hilliard made the principal address
at the seventeenth annual convention of the State Bar of Arizona
at Chandler, Ariz., on Saturday, April 15th. The Chief Justice's
address came as the climax to a three-day bar session which fea-
tured such other well-known speakers as Harold J. Gallagher,
president of the American Bar Association; Jerry Giesler, famous
Los Angeles attorney; and the Hon. Harry C. Westover, judge of
the U. S. District Court for the district of Southern California.
Raymond R. Brady, a former member of the Denver and Colo-
rado bar associations, is now engaged in general practice at 301
Utah Savings and Trust Bldg., Salt Lake City. Col. Brady, who
spent his youth in Alamosa and Salida, was Staff Judge Advocate
at Lowry Field for two years during the war. He retired from the
armed forces in November, 1946.
41 McNichols v. Denver, supra, note 24.
"Rule 57.
"San Luis Power v. Trujillo, supra, note 28.
,COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 85 (1935).
"This seems to be the rule in Colorado. See, Employer's Mutual v. Board of County
Commissioners, 102 Colo. 177, 78 P. 2d 380 (1938) ; Tellman v. Smith, supra, note 13;
Cf, Lueras v. Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 65 P. 2d 1431 (1937).
4' Today 60 per cent of all equity actions in England are adjudicated in this manner,
ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, § 1 et seq.
469 Congressional Record 2108 (1928).
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